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deterrent capability readily available at need and, in the event of attack, to complicate the Argentinian task.

7. It should also be remembered that our undoubted capability for interdiction of Argentinian sea and air communications, should they occupy the Islands by force, constitutes in itself a serious deterrent.

8. The continuation for any length of time of the above deterrent measures would, of course, impose increased penalties on our forces.

Ministry of Defence
21 February 1975

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9
10 Downing Street
Whitehall

27 March 1975

Falkland Islands

Following my conversation with the Permanent Under Secretary yesterday evening about the terms of the proposed instructions to be sent to H.M. Ambassador in Buenos Aires following the Argentine Foreign Minister's press conference on 19 March, I have consulted the Prime Minister who has noted what is proposed, and has raised no objection. I have in particular drawn his attention to the last sentence of the second paragraph in the draft telegram in which Mr. Ashe is instructed to tell the Foreign Minister that the Argentine Government must "clearly understand that an attack on the Islands would meet with a military response."

I have told the Prime Minister that this subject is likely to be considered further in OPD or Cabinet after the Easter holiday.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

A. A. Acland, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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81

PRIME MINISTER

*Noted
HW*

Falkland Islands

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has asked that you should be consulted about the terms of an instruction which he proposes to send as soon as possible to H.M. Ambassador in Buenos Aires to speak to the Argentine Foreign Minister following remarks by the Argentine Foreign Minister at a press conference on 19 March in which Senor Vignes suggested that the only alternatives over the Falkland Islands were negotiation or invasion.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that our aim should be to avert a military confrontation and to gain time until Ministers are able to consider the whole question further in O.P.D. or Cabinet after the Easter holiday. He also believes, however, that we should make it clear to the Argentine Government that an attack on the Falkland Islands would meet with a military response.

The Ministry of Defence have been consulted (though it has not been possible to consult Mr. Mason, who has flown to Riyadh for King Faisal's funeral) and are not able to give any firm indication of what military response would be possible; they are however certain that any such response will almost certainly be regarded as inadequate. The platoon of 22 Marines stationed on the Falkland Islands would not be able to put up any effective response against an attack by air.

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/We are therefore

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-2-

We are therefore faced with the dilemma of, on the one hand, committing ourselves to a military response which might, in the event, prove inadequate and lead either to the surrender of the Falkland Islands or full scale war with Argentina; or, on the other, of failing to respond to Argentine threats with possible consequences for our position in Belize and Gibraltar.

Since H.M. Ambassador (who has only just taken up his post) is almost certain to see Senor Vignes within the next few days, Mr. Callaghan would like to send the attached instructions. (The sentence at issue is the last sentence of paragraph 2.) Do you agree?

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thw

26 March 1975

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 Falkland Islands
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[TEXT]

My telno 133

1. The following instructions supersede those given in my telno 124. You should now speak on the following lines.

2. Ministers were disconcerted to hear of Sr Vignes' press conference on 19 March, only two days before you were due to arrive in Buenos Aires. They realise that he has a problem with public opinion in Argentina over this question. But British Ministers also cannot move ahead of British opinion. ^{statements such as this} The statements reported in your telegrams nos 151 and 152 have ^{made} made it difficult for Ministers to ^{consider} adopt new policies. The Minister of Foreign Affairs will not doubt have observed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have said nothing to the press about the statement. This is due to our desire not to exacerbate the situation in any way. Should it be further exacerbated by threats of armed conflict, pressure would /mount

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mount on Ministers to demonstrate their determination to defend the Islands. ^{The Argentine Government must} ~~It should therefore be~~ clearly understood that an attack on the Islands would meet with a military response.

3. This situation and "the Big Thing" to which it could give rise surely cannot give satisfaction to either government. HMG wish to avoid any confrontation with Argentina. The only alternative to confrontation is negotiation. The question of the Islands has already received much attention from Ministers despite their other preoccupations (see the first four sentences of para 2 of my tel no 124). It is ^{soon} ~~shortly~~ to be considered at Cabinet level, after which ~~you~~ ^{Ministers} will give fresh instructions. ~~You~~ can expect these before the end of April (when the Commonwealth Conference will take place at Kingston). *If the programme can be maintained gm*

4. Professor Griffiths' report: you should say that this has only just been delivered to HMG. Mr Ennals has not forgotten his undertaking to make a copy available to Sr Vignes, but Ministers need to consider it before giving you instructions.

5. You should then draw on paragraphs 3 and 4 of my telno 124 to make clear the practical constraints in pursuing the Argentine government's goal - which we share - of a negotiated settlement. In all these circumstances, HMG stand ^{READY} ~~ready~~ to examine any proposal which the Argentine Government may now wish to put forward. In view of the reassessment mentioned in paragraph 3 above, the present is a particularly opportune moment for a constructive Argentine input.

6. You should conclude on the lines of paragraph 7 of my telno 124.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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IMMEDIATE

CIPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

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FH FCO 211205Z

TO BA - 121

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DESKBY 211500Z

TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES TELNO 124 OF 21 MARCH INFO PORT STANLILY
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. WHEN YOU HAVE YOUR FIRST SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION WITH THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, YOU SHOULD SPEAK ON THE FOLLOWING
LINES. BEGINS.

2. AS YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL BE AWARE, MY GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN
GREATLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE VITAL QUESTION OF BRITISH MEMBERSHIP
OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. (IT WAS INCIDENTALLY THIS
PREOCCUPATION WHICH PREVENTED THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FROM
ACCOMPANYING THE QUEEN ON HER VISIT TO MEXICO.) HOWEVER, DURING THE
TIME WHICH HAS INTERVENED SINCE YOUR EXCELLENCY HAD AN EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS FIRST WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY IN NEW YORK AND THEN
WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE IN LIMA, MINISTERS HAVE BEEN GIVING
CLOSE CONSIDERATION TO THE MEASURES THEY MIGHT TAKE TO MAINTAIN
AND IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. THEY ARE DETERMINED TO
CHERISH AND CARRY FORWARD THE LONG STANDING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THEY HAVE, THEREFORE, INSTRUCTED ME TO INFORM
YOU THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME ANY PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS YOUR GOVERN-
MENT HAVE TO OFFER, INCLUDING ANY PROPOSALS ON THE ONE ISSUE WHICH
COULD DIVIDE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS - NAMELY, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
I WILL MOST READILY TRANSMIT ANY SUCH PROPOSALS TO MY GOVERNMENT
IMMEDIATELY.

3. I HAVE ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DRAW YOUR EXCELLENCY'S ATTENTION
TO THE DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER, WHICH FACE US IN THE FULFILMENT
OF OUR COMMON ENDEAVOUR. AS YOU WILL HAVE CERTAINLY DEDUCED, THE
STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAS BEEN GIVING
MY GOVERNMENT CAUSE FOR CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. FOR EXAMPLE, THE
COUNCILS' CHANGE OF MIND ABOUT A REGULAR S.T.N. SERVICE, AND THE
REACTION OF THE ISLANDERS TO THE FAILURE OF TOURIST SHIPS TO FLY

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/ A COUNTRY

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A COURTESY FLAG WHEN IN PORT STANLEY, HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE SENSITIVITY OF ISLAND OPINION ON MATTERS TOUCHING ON THEIR RELATION WITH ARGENTINA.

4. MY GOVERNMENT IS PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO SECURING THE CONSENT OF THE ISLANDERS TO ANY MAJOR CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT NO BRITISH GOVERNMENT, OF WHATEVER POLITICAL COMPLEXION, WILL BE ABLE TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT OVER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT. ANY SUCH CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WOULD REQUIRE A FORMAL TREATY AND THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED BY MAJORITIES IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT. SUCH PARLIAMENTARY ACCEPTANCE WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING UNLESS THE MAJORITY OF THE ISLANDERS HAD GIVEN THEIR CONSENT TO AN AGREEMENT. FOR THE TIME BEING, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPECT A MAJORITY OF THE ISLANDERS TO GIVE THEIR CONSENT TO ANY AGREEMENT EMBODYING MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS ALSO NO POSSIBILITY, AT PRESENT, OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OBTAINING APPROVAL IN PARLIAMENT FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

5. MY GOVERNMENT REALISE THAT THIS SITUATION CAN BRING YOUR EXCELLENCY LITTLE IMMEDIATE SATISFACTION. BUT GIVEN THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION, THEY CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT THE LACK OF MOVEMENT SO FAR SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO LEAD TO A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT COULD IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES LEAD TO A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. ON THE CONTRARY, IT COULD ONLY LEAD TO A STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH WOULD INDEFINITELY POSTPONE THE PROSPECT OF A SOLUTION WHICH WAS PEACEFULLY NEGOTIATED AND LIKELY TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO ALL CONCERNED. IT IS WITH THESE CONCERNS IN MIND THAT MINISTERS WISH TO BE MADE AWARE OF YOUR THINKING ON THIS PROBLEM.

6. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, WITH THE HELP OF GUIDANCE FROM H.M. GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE CONTINUED ENLIGHTENED COOPERATION OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, THE ISLANDERS MAY WELL COME TO SEE THE SITUATION DIFFERENTLY AND TO REASSESS WHERE THEIR INTERESTS LIE.

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7. FINALLY, MAY I REITERATE H.M. GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL SPHERES, BUT ALSO TO COOPERATE WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN EFFORTS TO REACH A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROBLEM. I CAN ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT H.M. GOVERNMENT REMAIN WILLING TO EXAMINE ANY PROPOSAL WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT WISH TO PUT FORWARD ENDS.

CALLAGHAN

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EW CLAIR

BA 151

See memo + letter to
Mr. Arthur [unclear]

FM BUENOS AIRES 20/1347Z

UNCLASSIFIED
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 151 OF 20 MARCH AND IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY,
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

[Handwritten initials]
27/3

MY TELNO 144: FALKLANDS AND OIL.

[Handwritten initials]

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY MFA LAST NIGHT:
TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ASSOCIATED
AREAS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATIONAL TERRITORY, THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT STATES THAT IT DOES NOT RECOGNISE AND WILL NOT RECOGNISE
THE TITLE NOR THE EXERCISE OF ANY RIGHT CONCERNING THE EXPLORATION
AND EXPLOITATION OF MINERALS OR HYDROCARBONS BY ANY FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT. NEITHER DOES ARGENTINA RECOGNISE NOR WILL IT
RECOGNISE AND IT WILL CONSIDER AS IRREVOCABLY NULL ANY ACTIVITY,
MEASURE, OR AGREEMENT WHICH GREAT BRITAIN MIGHT CARRY OUT OR ADOPT
RELATED TO THIS MATTER WHICH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS
TO BE OF THE GREATEST SERIOUSNESS AND IMPORTANCE. THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT ALSO CONSIDERS THAT ACTS OF THIS KIND WOULD BE CONTRARY
TO THE RESOLUTIONS AND CONSENSUSES ON THE FALKLANDS ADOPTED
BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

2. MIFT.

MAYNARD

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IMMEDIATE
CYBER CAT A

FM BUENOS AIRES 20/1400Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 152 OF 20 MARCH AND TO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY,
INFO UKMIS/^{NEW YORK}AND WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS AND OIL

1. VIGNES HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT TO FOLLOW UP THE MFA STATEMENT BY ISSUING A FURTHER STRONG VERBAL WARNING THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT RECOGNISE THAT ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT HAS ANY RIGHTS IN THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF OIL ROUND THE FALKLANDS. VIGNES SAID THAT MR ENIALS HAD PROMISED HIM A COPY OF THE GRIFFITHS REPORT LAST DECEMBER IN LIMA BUT ADDED CURIOUSLY THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THIS COULD BE THE REPORT CURRENTLY DESCRIBED IN THE PRESS (THIS STATEMENT IS PROBABLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT A SOMEWHAT MISLEADING UP REPORT COULD BE READ AS ATTRIBUTING TO THE FCO SPOKESMAN REMARKS THAT THE GRIFFITHS REPORT INDICATED LARGE DEPOSITS OF OIL WHEREAS THE REMARKS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY OIL COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES).
2. THIS WARNING IS UNMISTAKABLY DESIGNED TO PUT HMG AND THE OIL COMPANIES ON NOTICE THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT (NOT) ACCEPT THE ISSUE BY HMG OF EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION LICENCES, (MY TEL NO 440 OF 17 DECEMBER IS RELEVANT).
3. THE PRESS HAVE ALSO NOT FAILED TO MAKE A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE STORY OF OIL DEPOSITS AND THE FACT THAT UNDER THE DEFENCE REVIEW, THE FALKLANDS IS ONE OF THE FEW AREAS FROM WHICH TROOPS ARE NOT BEING WITHDRAWN.

MAYNARD

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MR R H G EDMONDS

c.c. PS to Miss Lestor
PS to PUS
Sir D Watson
WIAD
LAD

FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Secretary of State and Mr Ennals discussed this problem in the House of Commons last night. Mr Acland and I were present. The recommendation in Mr Ennals' minute of 31 January to the Secretary of State and the accompanying draft OPD memorandum were discussed.

2. The Secretary of State is not satisfied with the existing draft of the OPD paper. He wishes it to examine in greater thoroughness the problem of the defensibility of the islands; he is not disposed to accept at present that the islands cannot be defended. If this has to be the conclusion, it must represent a collective decision by OPD or Cabinet. Mr Callaghan further considers it essential that we should not allow future Argentinian references to the two options of negotiation or invasion to go unchallenged. We should make it clear that an Argentinian attack on the islands would meet with a military response and that unless the Argentinians want war the only alternative open to them is negotiation.
3. The OPD paper should also suggest that the Whitehall departments concerned should conduct a serious examination of the oil problem with the object of producing constructive proposals for its handling which could be discussed with the Argentines. One possibility might be joint exploitation.
4. The aim should be to put a revised OPD paper to Ministers for decision in about three weeks time. Meanwhile the current instructions to HM Ambassador in Buenos Aires should, in the light of recent telegrams, be revised. The Secretary of State wishes Mr Ashe to be given a degree of latitude which will enable him to buy time until OPD has taken a decision. It was for consideration whether he might say that the whole question was to be considered at Cabinet level in about three weeks time after which he expected

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to receive fresh instructions. But the danger of this is that it sets another deadline, and the conclusions of the Ministerial meeting may not be very precise. He might also say that Professor Griffiths' report on oil had just been handed over to HMG and, while we should soon be making a copy available to Vignes, Ministers needed to consider it further before giving the Ambassador final instructions.

5. Mr Ennals mentioned to the Secretary of State that we should be holding a "seminar" with the Falkland Islands Committee in a few weeks time.

6. Mr Ennals would like to have in time for his box closing at 5.30 p.m. today a draft telegram of instructions to Mr Ashe covering the points in paragraph 4 above as well as the point in the last sentence of paragraph 2. If it would be helpful Mr Ennals is prepared to send a personal message to Vignes making some of these points, which the Ambassador could deliver. He would also like to have a revised draft of the OPD paper in his box closing at 5.00 p.m. on Friday, 4 April.

A J COLES
26-3-75

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IMMEDIATE

PHER CAT A

FM BUENOS AIRES 241730Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 157 OF 24 MARCH AND TO IMMEDIATE PORT
STANLEY INFO UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 124 : FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I EXPECT TO BE SUMMONED TO SEE VIGNES WITHIN A FEW DAYS IN
ORDER TO DELIVER THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TUR.

2. I SHOULD WARN YOU THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY
EXPECTING PROPOSALS OF SUBSTANCE FOR THE OPENING OF TALKS AND
THESE INSTRUCTIONS MAY PROVOKE AN EXPLOSION. VIGNES IS
PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THE MYTH OF EXISTING TALKS ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT WE WOULD HAVE PROPOSALS IN DUE COURSE. NOW,
WE WILL LEAVE NO AVENUE OPEN.

3. THE ARGENTINES ARE WELL AWARE OF THE EXISTING TREND OF OPINION
AMONG THE ISLANDERS AGAINST THE ARGENTINE CONNECTION. SINCE
PARAGRAPH 4 SPELLS OUT THAT PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL FOR ANY
CHANGE WOULD NEVER BE FORTHCOMING UNLESS THE MAJORITY OF THE
ISLANDERS WERE IN FAVOUR, THE ARGENTINES CAN SEE FOR THEMSELVES
THAT WE WILL HAVE NOTHING TO OFFER IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
THIS COULD BE SEEN AS ALMOST AN OPEN INVITATION TO INVASION.

4. IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE
ME INSTRUCTIONS LATER TO RAISE MR. ENNALS PROPOSALS WITH THE
ARGENTINES, I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO SAY SO NOW. OTHERWISE
I FEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY SIMPLY ABANDON THE "PATH TO
NEGOTIATION".

ASHE

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Argentina 7



10 Downing Street
Whitehall

FEBRUARY
3 January 1975

The Falkland Islands

Thank you for your letter of 28 January in which you sent comments on the current state of the Falkland Islands problem. I have shown your letter and its enclosure to the Prime Minister, who was interested to read it.

AW

R.N. Dales, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 January 1975

Dear Patrick,

The Falkland Islands

In your letter of 20 January you asked for comments which you could show to the Prime Minister on the current state of the Falkland Islands problem.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary fully agrees that this problem could, unless skilfully handled, become a highly emotive issue here. Since we are now under combined Argentine and UN pressure to negotiate a solution, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has called for a review of our policy options. Mr Ennals is now engaged in directing this review, in which the new Governor of the Islands (Mr French) and the Ambassador designate to Buenos Aires (Mr Ashe) have been taking part. We hope that this review will be completed in time for recommendations to be made to OPD before the end of February.

Since May 1974, when Ministers last discussed the problem in OPD, the main development has been that, early in August, our dialogue in Buenos Aires about the Falklands was suspended for the time being, on Mr Callaghan's instructions, because of hardening opinion among the Falkland Islanders. Although both he and Mr Ennals have since discussed the Falklands question briefly with the Argentine Foreign Minister, the dialogue remains in suspense.

I will not attempt in this letter to anticipate the outcome of a review of the problem, which has become very complex. In addition to the wishes of the Falkland Islanders and the influence of the Falklands lobby in this country, other aspects which are being considered include our capacity to defend the Islands against a determined attack, our ability to exploit any oil resources in the South West Atlantic without reaching a settlement over the Islands with the Argentines, Anglo-American relations, our material interests in Argentina and UN opinion. ... On the latter, you may like to see the enclosed copy of a recent assessment by Ivor Richard.

Patrick Wright, Esq.,
No. 10 Downing Street,
London SW 1.

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As for using Punta Arenas in Chile as the point for rotating the garrison on the Falkland Islands, you will now know that the Foreign Secretary recommended to the Ministry of Defence that they should use Montevideo.

Yours ever,

R. N. Dales

(R. N. Dales)
Private Secretary

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LAD - for comment pl

cc. Minister of State
PS to Miss Lester
PS to PUS
Sir D. Wilson
Mr. Campbell o/v
Mr. Edmunds
Mr. Newland

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

①

30 December 1974

The Rt Hon David Ennals PC MP
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ADL 2/1

Dear David,

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THE UN

1. We found it extremely useful to have a first hand account from Relton and Hall of their visit to the Falkland Islands and Buenos Aires in December. As a consequence, we have been thinking about the UN implications if there is increased Argentine pressure in 1975 to take over the Islands. I hope our views may be helpful in the course of the policy review which you will be conducting in January and February, prior to the arrival of our new Ambassador in Buenos Aires.
2. You will be aware from our telegrams that the Argentinians went out of their way to keep the temperature down at the XXIXth Session. They spoke on three occasions; when Vignes addressed the General Assembly, and subsequently during the debates in the Fourth Committee and Plenary on decolonisation questions in general. Their interventions were moderate, and they gave us a broad outline in advance of what they were going to say. They made it clear that they were under instructions to play the dispute down, and we responded in kind. They did not press for a resolution on the Falklands, which would certainly have been passed by the usual large majority. In their last intervention in Plenary, they reiterated their claim to the exploitation of the Falklands' natural resources. We know that they had not intended to speak again, and presumably only did so because of the press campaign in Argentina about the possible discovery of oil in the Falklands' territorial waters. Nevertheless they used what they themselves described as "light artillery" in support of their claim.
3. It appears to be Relton and Hall's assessment, however, that we cannot expect our good fortune to continue in the new year. I would not wish to comment on the substance of the dispute, but it seems likely that if there is no further progress in negotiating a settlement, we must expect at the very least a renewed Argentine campaign at the UN. I understand also that an attempted military invasion of the Islands cannot now be entirely discounted.

Now see /4. It
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4. It goes without saying that if the Argentinians again force the issue to a vote at the UN, we shall once more be very much in a minority. Had there been a resolution this year, most EEC countries, with the exceptions of Ireland, Italy and perhaps Germany, would have abstained; so would the US, Canada, and one or two other WEOG countries (but not necessarily Australia and New Zealand). The Europeans support us mainly, out of Community solidarity. They assume, as do the Americans and Canadians, that the Falkland Islands will eventually be taken over by Argentina and can therefore see no reason to jeopardise their bilateral relations with Argentina in support of what they believe to be a losing cause. David Walker from Washington told us that the Americans intend to keep clear of the dispute, and certainly could not be counted on to urge restraint on the Argentinians. Our participation in the Committee of 24's work has put us in a slightly favourable position; but I do not believe that the Committee would ever take our side against Argentina's. The most that could be expected from the Committee would be a resolution urging the resumption of early negotiations; and somewhere in the text there would be a reference to the issue of sovereignty.

5. What worries me far more, however, is the effect upon our standing here of an invasion of the Falklands, assuming for the purpose that it were successful. I need hardly say that we would suffer a terrible loss of face, to put it no higher. It would, I think, be the first time in recent years that a colony had been successfully invaded. The Indonesian acquisition of West Irian offers a parallel in some respects, but in that instance there was at least the face-saving device of a temporary United Nations administration of the territory.

6. We also have to consider the possible repercussions of an Argentinian invasion upon our other colonial interests. We have a good case over Belize which we may want to exploit here next year, both in the Committee of 24 and in the General Assembly. If we can do so successfully, this in turn might strengthen our hand in future discussions of Gibraltar and the Falklands. But I would not place too much emphasis on this argument and the converse seems to me much more clear cut. If the Falklands are taken over, our position on Belize will inevitably be gravely weakened. The Guatemalans would be encouraged to stand by their claim until such time as we get tired of maintaining our garrison in Belize and pulled out without having secured any prior guarantees for Belize's independence. There might also be repercussions in Malaysia and Brunei.

/7. I

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I am, of course, in no position to judge whether there is a serious threat of invasion by Argentina nor whether such an invasion would be successful. The telegrams I have seen suggest that the Argentine Foreign Ministry will prefer negotiation so long as there is any chance of substantive talks on the sovereignty issue, and to that extent perhaps the danger is more apparent than real. What I am concerned about however is the possibility that we might be faced with a successful faint accompli. While it is difficult enough here defending our position as a sitting tenant it will be virtually impossible to do so once the "landlords" have resumed possession, for I fear Argentina would be so regarded by the majority at the United Nations.

James

1/6/61

2

Ivor Richard

c.c. E F G Maynard Esq
Charge d' Affaires
Buenos Aires

Governor
Port Stanley

D C Walker Esq
Washington

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Argentina ~~6~~
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1975

From The Minister of State
The Rt Hon David Ennals MP

They seem to
have accepted
my view
Montevideo.
OK
17

Prime Minister to see
(link of some to you
next minute to F.C.S.)

Thank you for your letter of 9 January in which you raised the question of whether we should use Punta Arenas or Montevideo for rotating the Falkland Islands detachment next month.

We have considered the matter carefully. I take the point that if we do not use Punta Arenas next month there is some risk that the Chileans may close this option to us for the future. This could cause some difficulty in the Falkland Islands connexion but I think it likely that if our dispute with Argentina seriously worsens the Argentines will successfully press all Latin American countries to deny us military facilities.

I note that in your judgement the military advantages of using Punta Arenas as opposed to Montevideo next month are only marginal. In these circumstances we (and I have consulted the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about this) believe that the political arguments against using Punta Arenas are decisive. Any appearance of cooperation with Chile in the military field could be very embarrassing at the present time. Much has happened since the OPD decision of 21 March 1974 to which you refer and we understand that the Prime Minister has expressed the view that, following the difficulties within the Labour Party about Chile last Spring, it seems desirable to use Montevideo for rotation purposes this year.

OPD(74)1ST MF
filed on
Chile mai 74
Part 1

William Rodgers Esq MP
Minister of State
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1

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/Our

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Our conclusion is, therefore, that Montevideo should be used instead of Punta Arenas.

Copies to:-

Sir John Hunt
Cabinet Office

✓ Mr P H R Wright
10 Downing Street

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~~B.E. 24/1/75~~

file 6 5

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

20 January 1975

The Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister has seen the recent paper prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee on the Falkland Islands in which a reference is made to the unlikelihood that the Argentine Government will change their policy from negotiation to official armed intervention before they have reassessed H.M.G.'s willingness to negotiate on the issue on sovereignty, following the arrival of the new British Ambassador.

The Prime Minister has commented on this paper that he hopes that we shall proceed with no greater speed in this matter than in the past, since it would certainly be an emotive issue here.

The Prime Minister has also asked whether there is any truth in a story that Punta Arenas is to be used shortly for shipping contact with the Falkland Islands for the purpose of rotating troops there. Mr. Wilson recalls that, after the major row within the Labour Party about Chile last spring, we used Montevideo for rotation purposes. He assumes that we will be sticking to that, since although the Chile row has died down, it was revived at the Labour Party Conference and could re-awaken following the request for a meeting on the Chile debt.

I should be grateful for any comments which you can let me have on this to show the Prime Minister.

TW

A. A. Acland, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MR. WRIGHT

Is there any truth in the story that Punta Arenas is to be used shortly for shipping contact with the Falkland Islands for the purpose of rotating troops there?

I seem to remember that after the big row about Chile last Spring we used Montevideo. I take it that we will be sticking to that since although the Chile row has died down, it was revived at Conference, and may re-awaken following the decisions expected about the rolling forward of Chilean debts.

ltw.

19 January 1975

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CRW

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COPY NO 2

16 January 1975

UK EYES A

CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Prime Minister

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

PH
16

The attached Immediate Assessment was approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee at their meeting on THURSDAY 16 JANUARY 1975.

Signed R H McV REDFERN

for Secretary
Joint Intelligence Committee

*I hope we shall proceed with no greater speed in this matter than in the past (to use the language of negotiators). It will certainly be an sensitive issue here.
Hw*

Cabinet Office

16 January 1975

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And telegraphed to -

Governor Falkland Islands, BE Buenos Aires, SNOWI

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SECRET - UK EYES A

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Ref: A06978

PRIME MINISTERFalkland Islands: Dispute with Argentina
(OPD(74) 12)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is looking for a new basis on which to resume the dialogue and thus avoid the Argentines taking action against our interests. Last October the islanders rejected the suggestion that there should be further talks about safeguards and guarantees of their interests on the hypothesis of transfer of sovereignty. Since then we have consulted the Governor and our Ambassador in Buenos Aires about the idea that we should offer to discuss safeguards and guarantees on the hypothesis of a condominium. They both consider this worth pursuing. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary therefore recommends that the Governor should explain frankly to his Executive Council the dangers of not resuming the dialogue with Argentina this summer and canvass, in confidence, the proposal to discuss with the Argentines the possibility of a condominium and in particular the safeguards and guarantees that would be required by the islanders. The next step would be to approach the Argentines, and if they agreed and discussions reached the stage of an outline agreement, the islanders would be formally consulted, e. g. by referendum.

2. The main question for the Committee is whether we ourselves could contemplate condominium as a solution. It would involve burdensome arrangements which might be thought disproportionate to the task of running a population of little over 2,000, and no doubt we would have to expect a certain amount of friction. On the other hand, if the Argentines agreed to discuss it, we would enter into a process of friendly discussion which could last quite a long time, and the present threats to our interests would be removed. Condominium would also have some advantages in the exploitation of the seabed, if oil should be discovered.

3. The Argentines would probably regard condominium as merely a stage on the way to sole sovereignty, but if they were prepared to take it at a measured pace and to continue to help the islands, the islanders might in the long run come to the conclusion that their own interests lay primarily in the Argentinian connection. The paper suggests that if the Argentines

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refused to talk on the basis proposed, the fact that we had made the offer would help us in the United Nations. It seems open to doubt whether this benefit would be a lasting one, but it might be worth something in the short term.

5. Although, therefore, the solution of a condominium is somewhat contrived, Ministers may feel that given the possible consequences of failure to resume the dialogue, the balance of argument is in favour of pursuing the idea.

6. You will note that our position over Gibraltar would not be harmed: Sir Joshua Hassan has said he would be ready to consider condominium if Spain proposed it. In Belize our position could be weakened slightly. (paragraph 7 of the memorandum).

JH
(John Hunt)

7th May, 1974

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